Microsoft Introduces “Trusted Baddies Framework” to Ensure Only Verified Baddies Can Serve Cunt Across Enterprise Environments

Redmond, WA — Microsoft has reportedly expanded Microsoft Tea™ with the Trusted Baddies Framework (TBF), a zero-trust identity architecture designed to address what executives called the rapidly growing problem of unverified motherfuckers claiming baddie status without adequate authentication.

The framework was introduced at the closing session of the company’s annual security conference, on a slide containing four words.

“Never trust. Always verify.”

Microsoft changed slides.

“Especially these hoes.”

The framework establishes formal controls for determining who is actually a baddie, what resources that baddie may access, and how much cunt they are authorized to serve.

CLASSIFICATION: ENTERPRISE IDENTITY ARCHITECTURE — ZERO TRUST
DISTRIBUTION: Chief Information Security Officers, Identity Governance Teams, Compliance Departments, Global Baddie Administrators (Permanent, Both of Them), Anyone Currently Serving Above Their Authorization Level
PREPARED BY: The Externality Research Division
DATE: August 2026

The Problem Statement

Our Research Division has obtained the internal whitepaper that preceded the announcement, and wishes to note at the outset that the whitepaper’s problem statement is the most honest threat model the Division has reviewed in eleven years of reviewing threat models.

Conventional security literature describes its adversary in neutral terms. The adversary is an actor. The actor is sophisticated. The actor is persistent. The actor is, above all, external, because the alternative is impolite.

The TBF whitepaper describes its adversary as follows:

“Unverified motherfuckers claiming baddie status without adequate authentication.”

The Division has evaluated this sentence against the standard criteria for a threat model — who, claiming what, to obtain what — and reports that it passes all three, which is more than can be said for most of the documents it will be cited alongside.

The underlying problem is real, and the Division wishes to be precise about it, because the precision is where the rest of the framework comes from. In any system where status carries privileges and claims of status are self-asserted, fraudulent claims accumulate at a rate proportional to the value of the privilege. This is true of network credentials, expense approvals, frequent-flyer tiers, and reserved parking. There was no reason to believe it would not be true of baddie status, and according to the whitepaper’s telemetry, it was true immediately.

The whitepaper cites internal data indicating that self-reported baddie status in enterprise environments exceeded verified baddie status by a factor of 34, that the gap was widening quarterly, and that the fastest-growing segment was individuals who, in the words of the appendix, showed up looking expensive.

A Microsoft security engineer summarized the situation for reporters:

“Everybody says they’re that bitch.”

She pulled up a dashboard.

“Statistically, almost nobody is that bitch.”

The Trusted Baddies Framework

Microsoft security engineers reportedly established five core principles:

1. Verify Explicitly — Nobody gets called a baddie just because they showed up looking expensive. Identity, device health, outfit, historical serving behavior, and current cunt posture must all be evaluated.

2. Use Least-Privilege Slay — Users receive only the minimum amount of cunt necessary to perform their assigned duties.

3. Assume Breach — At any moment, a fraudulent bitch may already be inside the organization.

4. Continuous Baddie Authentication — Being a baddie yesterday does not automatically establish baddie status today.

5. Trust No Hoe By Default — Microsoft’s security team reportedly insisted this was simply Zero Trust expressed in language executives could finally understand.

The Research Division placed the five principles beside the published zero-trust literature and reports that the mapping is exact. Verify explicitly, use least privilege, and assume breach are the three pillars of Microsoft’s actual Zero Trust guidance, reproduced in order, with two nouns changed. The fourth principle is continuous evaluation, which the literature already requires. The fifth principle is the first principle restated with a specific population attached.

The Division wishes to flag the fifth principle’s footnote, in which the security team describes it as Zero Trust in language executives could finally understand, because the footnote concedes something the industry has spent a decade not saying.

Zero trust was never a technology. It is a formal admission — published as a best practice, sold as an architecture — that the perimeter is gone and that the organization does not trust its own people. Every vendor deck since 2019 has contained this admission. Every vendor deck since 2019 has phrased it so that no one in the room has to hear it. The controls are described as protecting users. The users are what the controls are pointed at.

TBF’s sole architectural contribution is stating whom.

Our analysts note that this is why the framework survived legal review, marketing review, and two rounds of executive readout without a single principle being cut: there was nothing to cut. Every claim in the deck is defensible because every claim is the existing security industry with the nouns replaced, and the nouns were the only part that was ever going to get an executive to read the deck.

Baddie Identity Now Managed Through Entra

Microsoft Entra will become the official identity provider for Trusted Baddies.

Every participating user receives a:

The Research Division has reviewed the object schema and asks readers to consider what it means for a status to become an object in a directory, because the consequences are not cosmetic.

A status that lives in a directory can be provisioned. What can be provisioned can be deprovisioned. What can be deprovisioned can be licensed, and what can be licensed can be billed, and the progression from the first of these to the last is not a slippery slope but a product roadmap, printed in the deck, with dates.

Before the Trusted Baddies Framework, baddie status was self-asserted, socially arbitrated, and free. After the framework, it is verified, centrally administered, and invoiced per user per month. The Division wishes to be clear that the verification did not create the status. The status existed. The verification created the invoice.

Our analysts also direct attention to the second field, Mother Status: Conditional, which reviewers of the schema have treated as a joke and which the Division has classified as the only honest line in the object. Every status in an enterprise directory is conditional. It is conditional on employment, conditional on licensing, conditional on the renewal of an agreement the status-holder has never seen. The other five fields conceal this under words like Verified and Enabled. The second field simply says it.

Asked what happens to a user’s Baddie Identity Object when their organization’s subscription lapses, a Microsoft representative confirmed the object is retained for ninety days and then deleted.

A reporter asked whether the person remains a baddie during those ninety days.

The representative consulted his notes.

“In a soft-deleted state, yes.”

Conditional Slay Policies

Administrators can additionally establish Conditional Slay Policies.

For example:

The Research Division evaluated the policy engine and found it conventional in every respect but one, which is the respect it wishes to document.

A policy is a sentence about signals. Each condition in the example above requires a signal, and each signal requires a sensor. User identity comes from the directory. Device compliance comes from the management agent. Location comes from the device’s radios, which is to say from the device reporting where its owner is standing.

The Division then reached the fourth condition and stopped.

Outfit Risk is a score. A score requires telemetry. The Division asked Microsoft what telemetry feeds the Outfit Risk score, and received a response describing “a continuously evaluated composite signal incorporating contextual and environmental factors.”

The Division asked whether the composite signal incorporates the camera.

Microsoft described the signal as composite.

Our analysts note the structure, because it is the structure of every conditional-access conversation ever conducted. The framework is described as evaluating the user’s current cunt posture, and a posture cannot be evaluated without being observed, and the observation is continuous, and the continuous observation of a population is a term the industry does not use in decks. The controls are the surveillance. There is no version of the product in which they are separable, and the fourth condition is simply the first place in the policy where this becomes impossible not to notice.

The denial string itself received a full localization pass. The Division has confirmed that ACCESS DENIED: YOU THOUGHT YOU ATE ships in forty-one languages, and that the localization team’s notes for the German build run nine pages.

Microsoft Introduces Baddie MFA

Because passwords alone cannot establish baddie status, Trusted Baddies requires multifactor authentication.

Users must provide:

Something you know: the tea.

Something you have: the bag.

Something you are: that bitch.

Microsoft calls this:

THREE-FACTOR BADDIE AUTHENTICATION

Security researchers reportedly consider it unusually robust.

The Research Division commissioned an independent assessment of the three factors, and the findings are worth recording in full, because the assessment team entered the engagement expecting a joke and exited it with a report.

The first factor failed immediately. The tea is a knowledge factor, and knowledge factors are phishable, and the tea is uniquely phishable because the tea, by definition, wants to be told. The assessment team obtained the tea from four of five test subjects within one conversation, in three cases without asking. The report classifies the tea as a shared secret in which the emphasis falls entirely on the second word until it abruptly falls entirely on the first.

The second factor performed better. The bag is a possession factor, and possession factors resist remote attack. The known weakness is transferability — the report documents an entire attack class, discussed below, built on the bag moving between parties — and Microsoft has responded with bag binding, which cryptographically ties the bag to the baddie at enrollment. The team’s one reservation is recorded in a footnote observing that in every documented real-world compromise, the bag was not stolen. It was secured.

The third factor is the finding. The assessment team attempted for six weeks to replay, spoof, synthesize, or otherwise counterfeit that bitch, and reported total failure across all approaches. Being that bitch, the report concludes, is the only authentication factor in production that cannot be phished, because it is never transmitted. It is not a credential that proves the presence of the subject. It is the presence of the subject.

The report’s final section, however, is the reason the Division ordered the assessment, and it concerns revocation.

A password can be rotated. A bag can be reissued. A biometric cannot, and that bitch is a biometric. If that bitch is ever compromised — if, in the report’s example, a user is publicly observed giving basic — there is no recovery flow. The factor cannot be reset, because the factor is the user. The report notes that the industry has known about this property of biometrics for thirty years, has deployed them anyway at every scale, and has never once resolved the question of what happens to the person attached to a credential that can be lost but not changed.

There is no fallback bitch.

Privileged Baddie Management

Certain employees require elevated permissions.

These users receive:

PRIVILEGED BADDIE ACCESS

Possible roles include:

Global Baddie Administrator

Cunt Administrator

Tea Reader

Tea Contributor

Mother Administrator

Slay Compliance Officer

and the extremely sensitive:

HOE ADMINISTRATOR

The Research Division attempted to determine the scope of the Hoe Administrator role and reports that it could not. The role’s permissions are not documented. Its assignments are not visible to lesser administrators. The Division’s auditors located four accounts holding the role in the reference tenant, of which two were service accounts, one belonged to a contractor whose engagement ended in 2023, and one could not be attributed to any living person.

Microsoft, asked to explain, stated that the Hoe Administrator role exists for “break-glass scenarios.”

The Division asked what scenario requires administering hoes on an emergency basis.

Microsoft stated that customers would know it when they saw it.

Microsoft recommends organizations maintain no more than two permanent Global Baddie Administrators.

All other elevated privileges should use Just-In-Time Cunt Activation.

Before serving above their normal authorization level, users must provide a business justification.

Example:

The Research Division obtained one quarter of elevation logs from the reference deployment and analyzed all of them, because the logs are where privileged access management stops being an architecture and becomes a record of what people actually do.

The quarter contained 3,114 elevation requests. It contained 3,114 approvals.

The justification field is free text. Of the 3,114 justifications, 61 percent were a variant of “about to show these hoes.” A further 22 percent read “same as last time.” Eleven requests said “you know why,” and were approved.

Median approval latency was eleven seconds. The Division notes that eleven seconds is not review. Eleven seconds is the time it takes to click a button that one has decided in advance to click. The approval step is not a control on elevation. It is a mechanism for ensuring that when something goes wrong, the elevation has a name attached, and the name is not the approver’s.

Our analysts wish to be fair to the framework here, because the finding generalizes. This is not a property of Just-In-Time Cunt Activation. This is a property of every just-in-time privilege system in production, in every enterprise, today. The justification field is free text everywhere. The approval rate approaches unity everywhere. The design goal — a paper trail rather than a barrier — is achieved everywhere, and is written down nowhere, and the Trusted Baddies Framework’s contribution to the state of the art is that its example justification is the first one honest enough to be checked against the user’s subsequent behavior.

The user in the transcript above, the Division confirms, did show those hoes. The activity report is attached to the ticket. Compliance found no discrepancy.

Baddie Access Reviews

Managers must periodically review whether employees still require their assigned baddie privileges.

Microsoft provides several recommendations:

Does this user still require Mother access?

Has this user served within the previous 90 days?

Does this bitch actually need Global Administrator?

Why does Accounting have Tea Contributor?

Who gave Kevin Cunt Administrator?

Kevin’s access was reportedly revoked immediately.

The Research Division investigated Kevin, because Kevin is the only named individual in the framework’s documentation and the Division considers named individuals structurally significant.

Kevin did not request Cunt Administrator. Kevin was added, in 2019, to a distribution list for an offsite he did not attend. In 2021, the distribution list was granted Cunt Administrator on a temporary basis to unblock a migration. The migration completed. The grant did not. Kevin has therefore held one of the most sensitive roles in the framework for five years, through two reorganizations and eleven quarterly access reviews, every one of which approved him.

The Division wishes to note what Kevin did with the role during those five years, because it is the detail the incident report omits: nothing. Kevin never elevated. Kevin never served. Kevin was, in the only sense the logs can measure, the framework’s most compliant user, and he was removed for it, and the removal was correct, and both of those things are true at once, which is the entire discipline of access governance in one sentence.

Thirty-four days after Kevin’s access was revoked, the quarterly directory synchronization re-provisioned it, because the revocation had removed the assignment and not the mechanism. The distribution list still existed. Kevin was still on it. The Division reports that this loop — revoke the symptom, retain the cause, reconverge on the original state — is not a defect in the Trusted Baddies Framework. It is the standard behavior of every identity system ever deployed at scale, and every identity administrator reading this report is currently thinking of their own Kevin, by name.

The Division also reviewed the access review process itself. Ninety-six percent of review decisions in the reference tenant were submitted via the Approve All control, with a median time-on-page of forty seconds for reviews covering a median of two hundred assignments. One manager in the sample reviewed her list line by line. She is the reviewer who found Accounting’s Tea Contributor grant and asked why Accounting had it.

The answer had retired in 2022.

Microsoft Defender for Baddies

Microsoft Defender will continuously monitor organizations for:

BADDIE THREAT ACTORS

Known attack patterns include:

Impersonation of Mother

Credential Theft

Unauthorized Tea Extraction

Malicious Serving

Privilege Escalation to Cunt Administrator

Pass-the-Bag attacks

and:

ADVANCED PERSISTENT HATER — APH

Microsoft defines an APH as an individual who remains committed to hating despite repeated evidence that the target has, in fact, eaten.

Security teams are instructed not to engage directly.

The Research Division has reviewed the detection catalog and finds the definitions sturdier than their names suggest, beginning with the last one.

The Advanced Persistent Hater is a precise restatement of the advanced persistent threat, the industry’s term for an adversary distinguished not by capability but by commitment — an actor who establishes presence, maintains it quietly, and does not leave when repelled, because leaving was never the plan. Microsoft’s definition changes exactly one element: the motive. The APT wants data. The APH wants the target to know. Defender’s telemetry reportedly measures average hater dwell time at four years, with the longest continuously observed hater active since middle school.

The instruction not to engage directly is, the Division notes, the only guidance in the entire framework with a published evidence base. Engagement is the hater’s objective; every response extends the dwell time. The framework’s recommended countermeasure, documented under the name Serving Through It, instructs the target to continue eating, visibly, at scale, and is described in the operations guide as “the only known remediation that is also a deterrent.”

The catalog’s other detections reward reading. Impersonation of Mother is flagged behaviorally rather than by credential, on the documented ground that Mother does not announce herself, and that an account asserting Mother status in more than two channels per day is statistically not Mother. Unauthorized Tea Extraction is data exfiltration with the payload named honestly. And Pass-the-Bag is a rename of Pass-the-Hash, the twenty-year-old technique in which an attacker never learns the secret at all and simply presents the artifact that proves someone once did — which is, the Division observes, a materially better description of what happens to a bag than of what happens to a hash.

Asked whether Defender for Baddies could distinguish a Malicious Serve from an authorized one, a Microsoft engineer said the products of the two are identical and only the authorization differs.

A reporter observed that this meant the entire detection reduced to a lookup.

“Welcome to security.”

Trusted Baddie Attestation

Organizations requiring higher assurance may require employees to complete an annual:

BADDIE ATTESTATION

Employees must click:

I AM THAT BITCH

Microsoft Legal reportedly demanded an alternative button.

It received:

I CANNOT CURRENTLY ATTEST

The Research Division wishes to dwell on the second button, because the second button is, to the Division’s knowledge, unprecedented.

Every attestation in enterprise history offers one button. The training was completed: one button. The code of conduct was read: one button. The policies are understood and will be followed: one button. The single button converts a question into a formality, and the formality into a liability transfer, and the entire apparatus runs on the fact that declining is not a workflow anyone built.

Microsoft Legal, in demanding an alternative, built the workflow. An employee who is not currently serving, whose Mother status is contested, who is holding material tea, or who is, in the privacy of their own assessment, presently giving basic, has for the first time a truthful control to click.

In the pilot deployment, four percent of employees clicked it.

The Division has reviewed what happened next, because what happened next is the entire finding. The four percent were routed to a Human Resources queue titled Attestation Exceptions. The queue’s cases were closed, on average, nine days later, with the disposition Self-Resolved, when the employees in question returned and attested. No intervention was recorded in any case. Nothing was provided, adjusted, or asked.

The framework had produced, briefly, the only honest signal any enterprise system has ever collected about the condition of its workforce — four percent of the organization, self-reporting, under no compulsion, that they could not currently attest to being that bitch — and the organization’s response was to wait nine days for the signal to stop.

The Division notes that the signal did stop. The Division has been unable to establish that the condition did.

Government Version Announced

Microsoft also announced:

TRUSTED BADDIES FOR GOVERNMENT

supporting classified environments where particularly sensitive tea may be processed.

Clearance levels reportedly include:

The Research Division notes that the classification ladder is structurally identical to the federal original, including its most important property, which is not secrecy but compartmentalization. Tea at the highest level is not merely restricted; it is restricted to those with a need to know, and the final designation captures the operational reality of compartmented information more accurately than any official phrase the Division has encountered: the tea cannot be transmitted, cannot be written down, and cannot be discussed in the open. The cleared individual must be physically summoned. Girl, come here is not slang for this procedure. It is the procedure.

Classified tea may only be served inside accredited facilities, and the accreditation process requires agencies to obtain a formal Authority to Serve. The operations manual notes that tea processed in a secure facility may not leave it, a requirement the appendix summarizes in a sentence the Division reproduces without comment: what happens in the SCIF stays in the SCIF.

The federal government has reportedly ordered 14,000 licenses without fully understanding what it purchased.

The Division wishes to note, for readers inclined to treat this detail as the article’s least plausible, that it is the only detail in this section that required no exaggeration of any kind. Procurement at this scale is conducted against a schedule, from a pre-negotiated vehicle, by officers evaluating compliance rather than comprehension, and the question “what does it do” is not a field on any form in the process. The Division reviewed the solicitation. The requirement was zero trust. The product said zero trust. Fourteen thousand.

An agency spokesperson, asked what the licenses would be used for, said the agency was “committed to a posture of continuous verification.”

Asked to verify what, the spokesperson said the posture was continuous.

Licensing and the Analyst Response

The Trusted Baddies Framework will be included in Microsoft Tea E5.

It will not be included in Microsoft Tea E3.

Organizations on E3 may purchase the framework as a standalone add-on, priced per baddie per month, with an enterprise agreement minimum, a true-up at renewal, and an audit clause under which Microsoft may review the customer’s environment for unlicensed serving.

The Research Division asks readers to sit with the phrase unlicensed serving, because the phrase is the product.

Serving, before this framework, was a free activity. It occurred at every level of every organization, unmetered, unlogged, and unbilled. The framework does not enable serving — the whitepaper itself documents that serving predates the product by, conservatively, the whole of recorded history. What the framework enables is the distinction between serving that is licensed and serving that is not, and that distinction, once it exists, is worth exactly what the license costs, which is the price Microsoft set for it, per baddie, per month.

Industry analysts responded within the week. One firm published a comparative evaluation of the baddie identity market, positioning eleven vendors across two axes — completeness of vision and ability to execute — in four quadrants labeled Leaders, Challengers, Visionaries, and:

NICHE BITCHES

Microsoft appears in the Leaders quadrant. The Division notes that Microsoft commissioned the evaluation, defined the market being evaluated, and is at present the only vendor in it, and that none of these facts is disclosed in the quadrant, and that all of them are standard.

Microsoft Says Framework Solves Fundamental Security Problem

At the closing keynote, Microsoft’s Chief Information Security Officer summarized the philosophy behind the framework:

“You cannot simply allow every motherfucker who claims to be a baddie into a modern enterprise environment.”

The Research Division has evaluated this sentence and reports that it is true.

The Division wishes to be explicit about the finding, because the finding is the framework’s entire commercial architecture. Every sentence in the keynote is true. Unverified claims of status are a real problem. Least privilege is a real principle. Breach should be assumed, authentication should be continuous, and no hoe should be trusted by default, and each of these statements is defensible in front of any audit committee in the world, because each of them is the existing consensus of the security industry, translated.

What the translation purchased is attention, and what the attention purchases is budget, and the Division has now traced the full circuit. Trust, in its natural state, is established socially, maintained continuously, and priced at zero. The framework’s function is to remove trust from that state — to withdraw it from the population, on the stated and accurate ground that the population contains fraudulent bitches — and to reissue it as a directory object, which is to say as a product, which is to say per user, per month.

The framework does not create trust. No control in it creates trust. The framework meters trust, and metering requires that the unmetered supply first be declared unsafe, and the declaration is the keynote, and the keynote is true, and this is the only industry in which all of those statements coexist without any of them being a scandal.

The final slide appeared:

The room reportedly applauded.

The Division notes that the third line does not appear in any prior zero-trust literature, and that its addition completes the doctrine rather than parodying it. Never trust is the posture. Always verify is the mechanism. Assume hoes is the threat model, and the threat model was always the part the industry declined to write down, because writing it down makes clear that the hoes being assumed are the customers, the employees, the partners, and the readers of the slide.

They applauded anyway.

Closing Statement

At press time, the first production tenant reportedly completed its rollout of the Trusted Baddies Framework.

Every employee received a Baddie Identity Object.

Every object was verified.

Conditional Slay Policies were enforced.

The attestation campaign reached one hundred percent completion.

The tenant’s Chief Information Security Officer then attempted to access his own dashboard.

The screen displayed:

ACCESS DENIED: YOU THOUGHT YOU ATE

He filed a support ticket.

The ticket required elevation.

The elevation required a justification.

He typed: I administer this system.

The request was denied, with a reason code the Division reproduces here as the closing exhibit of this report, because it is the zero-trust doctrine applied, for once, all the way up:

CLAIM OF AUTHORITY IS NOT EVIDENCE OF AUTHORITY. NEVER TRUST. ALWAYS VERIFY. ASSUME HOES.